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COMMENT ON RE CENT DECISIONS
SALES-CONDITIONAL SALE-CONFLICT OF LAWS.-
Kennedy et al. v. National Cash Register Co., 279 S. W. 505
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 1926).
One Bryant, who lived and operated a cafe business in Texarkana,
Arkansas, addressed an order to the National Cash Register Co., of
Dayton, Ohio, requesting shipment of a $300 cash register for which
he agreed to pay certain installments. It was specified that the register
should remain the property of the cash register company until the price
or any judgment for same was paid in full. After the arrival of the
cash register, Bryant executed his note for the balance due as per terms
of order. A few months later he executed a chattel mortgage on certain
personal property, including the cash register, to secure a debt to a
bank in Texarkana, Texas. This mortgage was duly recorded in
Arkansas. Two months later Bryant sold his business and furniture
and fixtures, including the cash register, to one Brower. In the pur-
chase from Bryant, Brower assumed the indebtedness of Bryant, in-
cluding the debt to the bank and the balance due on the cash register.
Brower lived in Texas, but conducted the business in Arkansas. Brower
became bankrupt and filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in the
U. S. District Court in Texas. The trustee took charge of Brower's
personal property, which was located in Arkansas. The bank had also
become bankrupt and the defendant was appointed to take charge of
the assets of the bank. As between the bank and the trustee of Brower
it was agreed that the defendant should take charge of the cash regis-
ter. Defendant accordingly took possession of the cash register and
brought it into the state of Texas, where he now holds it as part of
the assets of the bank. Statute of Ohio provided for the recording of
conditional sales to make them valid as against subsequent purchasers
and mortgagees in good faith. This statute of Ohio had never been
complied with. The cash register company brought suit in the state
of Texas to recover the value of the register. The common law rule
applicable to conditional sales is in force in Arkansas. Defendant con-
tends that inasmuch as the order was accepted in Ohio, the Ohio
statute regarding recording of conditional sales should have been com-
plied with so as to defeat defendant's title, and also that as the suit is
brought in Texas, the courts of Texas should apply the Texas law
which requires registration of conditional sales so as to be valid against
subsequent purchasers and mortgagees without notice.
Held: The issues of law must be determined by the legal rights
which the bank acquired when it took the mortgage on the cash reg-
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ister from Bryant. The contract was finally consummated in Arkansas,
and is governed by the laws of that state. If this controversy were in
the State of Arkansas, the courts there would hold that the plaintiff's
rights were unaffected by the failure to comply with the registration
laws of Ohio. This controversy is governed by the laws of Arkansas,
and not the laws of Texas, because the property was brought into the
state of Texas by the unauthorized act of the defendants. The mort-
gage to the bank was an Arkansas contract, although actually executed
in Texas. A purchaser cannot go into another state, take possession
of property, bring it into this state, and then claim the benefit of the
laws of this state to the exclusion of the laws of the state from which
he wrongfully carried the property. As the laws of Arkansas do not
require a conditional sale of this character to be registered, or recorded,
in order to protect the vendor against subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees without actual notice, and as this case is governed by the
laws of Arkansas, the Texas court allowed the plaintiff below (the
cash register company) to recover the cash register.
The points decided in this case are in accordance with the weight
of authority, although some states hold otherwise. The apparent con-
fusion in these conditional sales cases is due to the fact that such sales
are often made in one state while the goods remain in or are taken to
another state, and because some states by statute make conditional sales
void as to creditors and subsequent purchasers in good faith unless
recorded, while in other states such sales are void against third persons
without recording statutes, and in still other states the common law
rule prevails that such contracts are valid even against third persons
without notice.
R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 2284, provides that conditional sales are void
as to subsequent purchasers in good faith and creditors, unless record-
ed. Many other states have such statutes. 35 Cyc. 682; 24 R. C. L. 465.
In Colorado conditional sales are not recognized as against inter-
ested parties without notice, on the ground that transactions of this
kind are opposed to public policy. Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201
Pac. 887, 25 A. L. R. 1149.
In almost all states where there is no statute to the contrary, con-
ditional sales contracts are valid as against third persons even without
notice. 35 Cyc. 664; 24 R. C. L. 454.
The general rule is in accordance with the principal case, that if
at the time of a conditional sale the chattel sold is not in the state in
which the sale is made, the laws of the state in which it is situated will
determine the effect of the contract. 24 R. C. L. 452; In re Meyer &
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Judd, 1 F. (2nd) 513, loc. cit. 524; Fry Bros. v. Theobald (Ky.) 265
S. W. 498; Cable Co. v. McElhoe (Ind.) 108 N. E. 790.
On the question of conflict of laws when the property has been
removed to another state, see 35 Cyc. 669; 24 R. C. L. 453; Harrison
v. Broadway Motor Co., 128 Miss. 766, 91 So. 453, 25 A. L. R. 1148;
Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887, 25 A. L. R. 1149; Parker-
Harris Co. v. Stephens, 205 Mo. App. 373, 224 S. W. 1036; Tenn.
Auto Corp. v. American Nat. Bank, 205 Ky. 541, 266 S. W. 54; Fry
v. Theobald, 265 S. W. 498; In re Meyer & Judd, 1 F. (2nd) 513.
C. S. N., '27.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE- INTOXICATING LIQUORS-
ODOR FROM FERMENTING MASH.-State v. Pigg (Mis-
souri), 278 S. W. 1030.
A police officer in the city of Columbia on smelling the odor of
fermenting liquors coming from an unoccupied automobile parked at
the side of the street, searched the car, finding liquor, seized it, and
subsequently, the owner claiming his car was arrested. Held, such
search and seizure was not unreasonable nor the arrest illegal being
based on such probable cause as not to be in conflict with Secs. 11
and 23 of Art. II of Missouri constitution pertaining to illegal search
and seizure.
The question of what are reasonable grounds to believe that a
misdemeanor is being committed so as to justify search and arrest
without a warrant has aroused much conflicting judicial opinion. Free-
dom from illegal search and seizure has been a privilege zealously
guarded throughout English history. At ancient common law, the
right of search and seizure was never recognized, and as late as Lord
Coke, the right of issuing search warrants before indictment was de-
nied. The Fourth Amendment to our Federal Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures, but there is no prohibition against
searches which are reasonable, and an unreasonable search and seizure
is said to be one for which there is in law a want of probable cause.
United States v. Snyder, 278 Fed. 650. Such is the case when a legal
warrant has been issued or in instances where public security demands
an arrest without warrant as in the case when a breach of the peace
is committed in the presence of an officer. Stittgen v. Rundle, 99 Wis.
78. The guaranty of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal
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